Lessons Learned at NCI

by Todd on July 23, 2010

Time and distance provides perspective.  During the transition period to BCG, I have been writing down some of the lessons from my time at NCI, especially the last 2 years as we were sailing into the teeth of a storm (a metaphor that I will get back to shortly).  In this post, I will focus on what I believe we did right, even though the outcome of NCI facing a restructuring was not what anyone wanted to see.

First, the metaphor.  I have read a lot about daring people, fastidiously preparing for the fight of their life, knowing the likelihood of a grim outcome.  Like, when I was a kid, the story about the army ants preparing to overrun the plantation and when I was a bit older climbers stranded in the wilderness and as an adult explorers facing racing to the South Pole with only what they had aboard their sleds as resources.  In all of these accounts, the protagonists ignored the likely outcome and set about applying every tool/asset they had to try to solve the massive problem.  At NCI, we saw this storm coming from miles away – knew it was massive and went about preparing our business as best we could to survive it.  The company’s equity survived a long time, all things considered, and the core assets survived to “fight another day”.

Here is what I take away:

1 – Know your exposure points and measure them frequently. We knew that NCI was overly exposed to residential real estate from long before I joined the company.  In 2005, we put together a study to see how correlated revenue was to home sale price, home sale volume, and average time on market.  We knew that we were (a) highly uncorrelated to historical price fluctuations (but we had never seen a price move of the magnitude that the market ultimately experienced), (b) highly correlated to historical volume (our business was best when lots of houses were selling) and (c) we were confounded by turn (homes turning too fast meant lower ad spends, homes turning too slowly also meant lower ad spends – there was a sweet-spot of months on market).  As the residential market fell off of its cliff(s), we were able to anticipate revenue losses and stay ahead of them with cost take-outs.  We monitored the key macro and market level data to make these cut decisions and did not wait for losses to mount.

2 – Don’t deviate from the core framework of the business. A significant chunk of NCI is run by 300+ Independent Distributors who have the exclusive license to sell The Real Estate Book in their territory.  We had a simple framework for decision making that we were able to maintain, even in the most challenging times.  First, make sure our advertisers (customers) are making money, and then make sure that our Independent Distributors are making money (channel), and finally make sure that we are making money.  While we shifted resources to markets with greater short term opportunity (Apartment Finder), we never reversed the order.  We held the firm belief that the macro forces of immigration, population growth, household formation and the need for housing would ultimately drive the residential real estate market back to equilibrium (dependent on jobs growth), and that so long as we were able to keep that decision framework, NCI would be able to participate in the recovery.  Note – there is nothing in the framework that dictates product formulation, pricing model, positioning, etc.  NCI has been able to stay active and involved in most of its markets by maintaining this perspective.

3 – Use every tool at your disposal to optimize your cost structure. I recently sat in on a BCG update on “Hot Topics for the IT World”.  While NCI was facing massive revenue declines, we were testing every method for driving costs down and were early adopters of many of the key trends identified in the BCG update:

  • cloud computing,
  • enterprise 2.0 tools,
  • social media marketing,
  • global sourcing,
  • use of open source code,
  • enterprise data mash-ups,
  • data intensive analytics

Back to the metaphor.  We tried these things to “tighten the rigging” on our ship.  We had no misconception that more efficient innovation, lower cost development, lower cost infrastructure or even new product development and new revenue sources would be enough to counteract the magnitude of the residential real estate meltdown, but we did it anyway.  We knew that if the storm continued to get worse, the debt would need to be restructured – but we did the right thing by using these leading edge capabilities to take cost out.  No one “went below deck” to hide and ride things out.

4 – Continue open and frank communications. I don’t remember a moment when we sugarcoated a message.  Dan continued to hold quarterly “State of the Business” updates, with good and bad news in black and white.  Everything was out in the open.  This permitted us to make very tough decisions about resource allocation without creating mass confusion for our employees.

5 – Constant culling of the portfolio. While there is some interconnectedness between markets and products within the NCI portfolio, we were constantly evaluating each one of these elements and made tough calls with regard to resource allocation as well as market closures.  We did not have extra cash flow to support unprofitable markets that did not have a near term, realistic opportunity to reverse the trend.  Again to the metaphor, we had finite resources and needed to constantly be performing triage.  Giving too much to save a troubled market would leave too little to support those with growth prospects.  With the “never say die” attitude that pervades NCI, this proved to be one of the toughest problems to solve.

{ 1 comment }

Bittersweet is Underrated

by Todd on June 29, 2010

My family is dealing with a lot of bittersweet right now.  It turns out, bittersweet is underrated.

Sammy is changing schools for 5th grade.  We loved Rodeph, it was nurturing, well structured and rigorous – the educational foundation was excellent.  Sammy has great friends there and we love the community.  Unfortunately, the school only goes to 8th grade, so we needed to make the switch sometime.  We applied to what has long been our first choice for Sammy – an amazing all-boys school in our neighborhood.  We were thrilled when he was admitted to Collegiate.  The school gives Sammy the chance to grow, expand his independence, and explore academics, arts and athletics in greater depth than Rodeph could offer.  We loved Rodeph and owe the faculty, staff and families a true debt of gratitude.  In this case, bittersweet feels great.  We had an amazing experience, and I would not change anything about the years we spent there, at the same time we are excited for the next chapter.

I am facing the same emotion with my career.  I have left NCI and am joining Boston Consulting Group.  Again, bittersweet.  NCI was a great place for me.  I had a chance to work with people I trust and enjoy.  Dan McCarthy, the CEO at NCI, has been a mentor to me since we first worked together in 1998.  Dan and I have been great partners at both Primedia and now at NCI.  I have tremendous respect for him, his loyalty to NCI, his vision and his leadership.  Gerry Parker, the CFO, is a straight-shooter with an amazing grasp of the macro and the micro (Gerry seems to remember every bill ever paid by NCI).  Gerry has great judgment, an extremely even keel and the ability to guide the organization in growth and in decline.  I will sincerely miss working with Dan and Gerry.

At NCI, we had the opportunity to be resourceful, aggressive, move fast and do things most of our competitors were unwilling to try.  I had the opportunity to work with a team who had a bias for pace and execution that continues to amaze me – in fact part of the bittersweet nature of the departure is leaving the Interactive team and the By Design Publishing team in such capable hands.  I know that TJ, Scott, Belinda and Teresa are up to the task and have developed great decision making frameworks to drive the business in the right directions.

In moving to BCG, I had significant time for introspection.  I know what I excell at, and I know what I love to do – I love solving tough problems, I love analyzing complex situations, I love working with smart teams, I love finding the creative solution.  I had worked with the BCG guys when I was at Cendant and was impressed by the team, their approach and their work.  I am truly excited for the change and thrilled to be joining the BCG NY Office.  While the change is bittersweet, I have no regrets about NCI and nothing but enthusiasm for the next chapter!

{ 7 comments }

All Strategy is Local

by Todd on June 8, 2010

I have been re-reading The Curse of the Mogul.  It is a “must read” for media professionals.  One of the footnotes references an article that I found really interesting; All Strategy is Local by Bruce Greenwald and Judd Kahn from HBR in September of 2005.

The premise of both the book and the article is the same; strategy = finding and maintaining competitive advantage and the lack of competitive advantage requires achieving superior efficiency to retain profitability.  The HBR article goes on to show how smaller, better defined markets are easier places to find competitive advantage.  A theme that I have seen over and over again in my career.

One of the first points that Greenwald makes is that barriers to entry are easier to maintain in tightly defined markets.  This was certainly true at NCI, where great performance both for NCI and for our advertisers was almost always a function of local market competition.  A great example is the magazine, “At Home in Arkansas”.  It is a terrific producer of leads and client satisfaction for our advertisers.  It gets great reader ratings as it truly speaks to the local market and local design vernacular.  It also generates outstanding profit.  Being a tightly defined market, there can not be outsized expectations for growth, but so long as the team keeps barriers to entry high by maintaining a high quality product with exceptional advertiser returns, it can sustain that profit for the foreseeable future.

Another example comes from the Apartment Finder brand.  The Apartment Finder print product exists in markets where there are anywhere from zero to three competitors.  Almost universally, fewer competitors leads to better results – again for both our advertisers as measured in cost per lead and for NCI as measured in profitability.  NCI recognized that raising price in lightly competed local markets would invite competition entry and ultimately destroy profitability for us and destroy efficiency for our customers.

The inverse can be found on the national real estate listing sites (Realtor.com, Zillow, Trulia, etc.).  As Zillow and Trulia have demonstrated, barriers to entry are relatively low.  They have both been able to gain share of visitors over a short period of time with relatively small investments (when compared to the inception to date investment from Move.com and its “high-ground” position being the only national site with all MLS data).  There is very little differentiation among the offerings, very little differentiation among the pricing strategies and every innovation is matched tit-for-tat.  In this space, I would expect efficiency to ultimately define the winner (a pseudo-regulatory advantage granted to Realtor.com did not create enough of an advantage for sustained profits).  In this case I would look at revenue and visitors per employee or per capital dollar as the key measure to identify the future profit winners.

The biggest question that remains to be battled in this space is the impact of the national web businesses on the local media markets.  I believe that the question boils down competitive advantage.  If the goal of marketing is to stand out in your well defined local market so that you can have more than your ratable share of the profits, can locally distributed, local media be more efficient in creating marketing differentiation in that well defined geography than a national media product?  It is the same question for local radio, newspapers, magazines, direct mail, local TV buys and billboards.  So, while record stores are mostly a memory (almost all music can be purchased digitally, what competitive advantage can a local retailer provide?), no one has replaced my local dry-cleaner, my local restaurant or my local doctor (yet).

{ 1 comment }

Average Performance can be Decieving

by Todd on April 28, 2010

I still remember first semester at business school when my professor, Paul Glasserman, handed back the first stats test of the year and dryly said, “Remember, not everyone can be above average.” This is certainly true for Apartment Communities and lead generation – not all properties perform above average…

Averages can be deceiving and using averages to make business decisions can leave a ton of value on the table. Similarly, understanding the factors that drive the outliers in performance can create significant value. This is why there can be INCREASING return in analyzing marginally more granular data.

Before I go to the apartment data (which is very cool, by the way), here are a couple of examples from my career that reinforce the point.

When I was at Cendant and was responsible for our Membership Travel business, our cost center cost drivers were sales-per-call and “minutes per completed call” – those metrics described most of our variable cost (agent time, telephone time, etc.). When I began running the business, every decision was made on “average call time”. I don’t remember the real number, but let’s call it 12 minutes for an average sale. So, cool, if we can get some tools to make it 11 minutes or 10 minutes, that will drive profit per call. We ran with monitoring the average for a while, and then I asked to see the raw telephone switch data. One thing that leapt out at me was that there were some CRAZY long calls. No one had ever mentioned it to me, but when we looked back at reports we found that a portion of our calls, call it 10%, were what we called “Long Calls” – calls lasting 25+ minutes. Most of those calls were significantly unprofitable for us. By zeroing in on the cause of the long calls (mostly picking hotels in big cities like NYC, LA or Chicago) we could significantly reduce our cost. While the average was important, the outliers were the key lever for improved performance.

Now for the cool Apartment stuff. Here is what we know:

  • Like Paul Glasserman said, not all properties can perform above average.
  • At NCI we have TONS of data about how different properties perform in terms of lead generation.
  • We can hire a really smart stats PhD to CRUNCH this data. (So we did)
  • We can ask the question, “Why do some properties perform better than average and others worse?” Where performance is measured in leads generated.

First some descriptive data:

Our data represented more than 10,000 properties with phone and email leads generated over an 11 month period. That is tens of millions of magazine copies distributed, tens of millions of unique visitors, millions of leads.

On average (oooh, I hate that word), the properties advertised on Apartment Finder:

  • Ask $844 per month in rent
  • Have 964 square feet
  • Have 1.8 bedrooms
  • Have 1.4 bathrooms

When taking a look at the key amenities offered, here is the % frequency of each facet.

Image

It seems that offering a pool is “table stakes” for a community.

Our analysis focused on “observable characteristics” – like asking price, the amenities offered, square footage, bedrooms, leads, etc. We know that there are “unobservable characteristics” that change these results. For example, ugly pictures hurt lead production. Being in a “bad part of town” hurts lead production.

First we asked the question – what amenities drive leads? In our first assessment we took price out of the regression. So there are two ways to read the chart. One way is to say that by offering a garage, you should expect 11% fewer leads than average and by offering a Washer Dryer Hookup, you should expect roughly 20% more leads than average. However, another way to look at the data is the signaling of price. Higher priced apartment complexes generate fewer leads than average and tend to have Garages, Fitness Centers, Washer/Dryers, etc. Most interesting is that allowing pets provides a significant lift in leads without being associated with price.

Image

Next, we asked how does price fit into the equation. For the following chart, you can read it as “if you add a given amenity to an average property, how much can you change monthly asking rent and receive average leads ?”

Image

In this chart, Fitness Center, Gated Community, Garage all indicate a more expensive property, where you can ask for more rent and still receive average leads. With Washer Dryer Hook-Up, you are signaling a less expensive property and need to reduce asking rent by a significant amount (more than the cost of a washer dryer) in order to maintain average leads.

We are getting close to having a model that we can run against the “observable characteristics” of an apartment community advertiser to predict how many leads that property should generate. We can then help our advertisers to understand if they are an “outlier”. If they are getting more leads than they should expect per the model, should they test raising the asking rent? If they are getting fewer leads than the model predicts, do they need to rewrite their property description or take new photos?

By helping the properties who perform below predicted lead volumes improve their “unobservable characteristics” we can help them drive their business. We believe that generating more, high quality leads for all of our advertisers will help drive our business.

Reblog this post [with Zemanta]

{ 3 comments }

Innovation Metabolism

by Todd on April 20, 2010

In my last post about business and technology, I described the current state of low-cost, low-risk innovations that permits our company to have a “bias to test”.  We have low hurdles to try new ideas, can test them on a portion of our audience, can explicitly measure the results of the test and deploy what works.  I answered a bit about “what works” in a prior post about metric myopia.  In this world, with low capex risk, low consumer perception risk, low client perception risk, the game becomes that of metabolism.  How quickly we can evolve our products becomes our competitive advantage.

Our push right now is to keep our innovation cycle (hypothesize, test, measure, tinker, deploy or kill) as short as possible so that we can try as many things as possible.  It is a bit Darwinian, but think of each of these tests as a mutation – it either helps, hurts or is neutral.  So long as we can quickly identify and eliminate the “bad” mutations, we will be getting forever more effective.

Some tests are simple, like “does an orange call-to-action button test better than a blue one?”  Other tests are a bit more complex; “what grade reading level for our content posts drives the most engagement?”  The key here is frequency.  It is working for us remarkably well.

It is also working for Apple.

There have only been 3 releases of the iPhone so far (and one strategically dropped prototype).  But the metabolism rate of the iPhone is incredibly rapid.  The basic functions don’t change (make a call, take a picture, locate yourself, get info from the web, post info to the web…) but the apps do.

For a consumer, investing in almost all apps (with the exception maybe of TomTom), is an almost no risk proposition.  You are paying a buck or two in order to find out if your iPhone can become of greater utility than it was two minutes ago.  I have not yet seen a report of iPhone virus apps.   If the app sucks, delete it and maybe read a couple of more reviews next time.  If the app is great, it is as if you just got a slightly better version of the phone beamed to your hand.  The product is constantly evolving, being driven forward by a volunteer work force (in Apple’s perspective), constantly innovating to make a better mousetrap.

So, what are the hallmarks of a good, fast metabolism?

  • low consumer cost for each incremental change
  • an environment that can immediately assess good vs. bad changes
  • low business risk for each change introduced (you should be more thoughtful when “betting the business”)
  • have a going in hypothesis to test (otherwise, how can you tell if it worked)
  • develop a bias for facts as opposed to opinions
  • be happy with failed tests – if every idea is better than what you already have, what you already have can’t be very good

The iPad corollary – just because you have a product with a fast metabolism (the iPhone), does not mean you can’t benefit from quantum changes (Apple seems to be selling a bunch of iPads).  Just remember, the risk-reward profile is vastly different and requires a different kind of innovation approach.

{ 0 comments }

Business and Technology

April 15, 2010

Conversations seem to come in batches. Over the past 2 weeks or so, I have had a lot of independent discussions about technology and business (my business, our customer businesses and others). The conversations have spanned topics like taking out systemic costs, gathering and assessing information for better decision making, testing revenue assumptions with very [...]

Read the full article →

Monopoly, Risk and a 10 Year Old Perspective on Strategy

April 8, 2010

The iPhone/iPod Touch is a fascinating device for kids. It is so intuitive that it is a bit addictive. While I would never suggest that Sammy should replace reading, studying, sports, play, family or music time with iPhone time, I have watched Sammy become a good Scrabble player, better at speed math (through the “PopMath” [...]

Read the full article →

Speaking to Listen

March 30, 2010

Last week I spoke at the BIA/Kelsey Marketplaces Conference about NCI’s Digital Sherpa product. The conference covered local, vertical online markets and was well represented by online businesses large (Google, AOL), medium (Groupon, ServiceMagic, Oodle) and Small (Loopt, MojoPages). What was interesting and liberating for me was speaking with the only goal of eliciting response [...]

Read the full article →

The Unintended Consequences of Metrics

March 4, 2010

I have written a couple of times about the consequences of incentives. Metrics work the same way. As some people were quick to (correctly) point out, not all incentives are monetary and business metrics that are monitored, even without a bonus attached, become incentives in and of themselves. When I was a consultant a lifetime [...]

Read the full article →

Delta Comes Through

March 4, 2010

I am glad to say that Delta ultimately stepped up and has “made it right”.  Interesting point here is that the review of my complaint was prompted by my #Delta tweet and the follow-up, through Twitter by Direct Message of their customer service rep.   I truly believe that without the Social Media aspect of this [...]

Related Posts with Thumbnails
Read the full article →